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ANTI-SLAPP COVERAGE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: HURDLES TO DEFAMATION
SUITS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
DAVID L. HUDSON, JR.*
Defamation cases often arise out of intemperate or offensive statements made
in political campaigns. These comments may refer to a candidate’s criminal
history, familial conduct, or other matters. Whatever the subject, emotions
undoubtedly run high during hotly contested campaigns.
However, First Amendment protection is at its zenith when speakers engage
in political speech, and speech about political candidates is inherently political
speech. Thus, defamation suits arising out of political campaigns face
significant hurdles, including (1) anti-SLAPP statutes and a greater public
awareness of SLAPP suits; (2) a history and tradition of mudslinging and
enhanced protection of political speech during political campaigns; and (3) the
first-amendment-inspired doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole. This Article addresses
these three obstacles.
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INTRODUCTION
During the course of a contentious campaign, unflattering social
media posts trickle in about a political candidate’s past indiscretions,
familial issues, and complicated political records. The candidate loses
a narrow election. The candidate then sues for defamation after losing
an election. She believes that the defamatory comments about her
were false statements of fact that not only harmed her reputation but
also cost her the election.
Such is not a farfetched reality, as political candidates often sue their
opponents or other individuals for intemperate campaign mudslinging.1
Much of this speech, as with nearly all other forms of speech, takes place
in the form of posts on social media, a venue that has become the push
point for much litigation.2
But such online defamation lawsuits that arise in the context of political
campaigns face several significant hurdles. This Essay addresses several
such hurdles, including (1) greater public awareness of SLAPP suits and
stronger anti-SLAPP laws; (2) a history of political mudslinging during
political campaigns and the strong protection of political speech; and
(3) the defense of rhetorical hyperbole.
I. ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES
In the 1980s, the term “SLAPP” entered the public lexicon as a catchy
acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Coined by
Professors George Pring and Penelope Canan, the term applied to
1. David Frum, Tulsi Gabbard Sues for Attention, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/tulsi-gabbard-suesattention/605374; Bryan Schatz, Darrell Issa is Suing His Defeated Opponent for Libel, MOTHER
JONES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/darrell-issa-libellawsuit-doug-applegate [https://perma.cc/7DVA-GM9X]; Riley Snyder, Tarkanian Libel
Lawsuit Against Jacky Rosen, 2016 Opponent, Blocked by Nevada Supreme Court, NEV. INDEP. (Dec.
12, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/tarkanian-libel-lawsuitagainst-jacky-rosen-2016-opponent-blocked-by-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/92QVLLVU]; Brian Whitehead, San Bernardino City Council Candidate Sues Opponent for Defamation,
Libel, SAN BERNARDINO SUN (Nov. 1, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://www.sbsun.com/
2018/11/01/san-bernardino-city-council-candidate-sues-opponent-for-defamation-libel
[https://perma.cc/ES3Z-6GQR].
2. Cory Batza, Comment, Trending Now: The Role of Defamation Law in Remedying
Harm from Social Media Backlash, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 429, 433 (2017) (noting that “[v]ictims
of defamatory statements on social media have increasingly begun suing for
defamation”); David L. Hudson, Jr., Free Speech or Censorship? Social Media Litigation is a
Hot Legal Battleground, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2019, 12:05 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/social-clashes-digital-free-speech [https://perma.cc/3JZV-4K5Q].
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lawsuits often filed by developers and other large construction companies
against citizen-activists who objected to alleged environmental abuses.3
The two University of Denver professors identified the phenomenon as
part of a “new and very disturbing trend”4—citizens being sued merely for
exercising their First Amendment rights.
The plaintiffs in these lawsuits sought to “‘privatize’ public debate”
through the judiciary.5 The result was that in tens of thousands of cases,
citizens were “sued into silence.”6 Such lawsuits “chill the right of free
expression and free access to government, a double-barreled assault
on the core values of our society.”7
In other words, SLAPP lawsuits seek to limit public participation. For
this reason, many anti-SLAPP statutes are called Citizen Public
Participation Acts.8 These lawsuits often assert such causes of action as
defamation, malicious prosecution, interference with existing contractual
relations, abuse of process, or conspiracy to commit these wrongs.9
A New York judge captured the negative essence of SLAPP suits in
this colorful description:
SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena
where the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a
defense. The longer the litigation can be stretched out, the more
litigation that can be churned, the greater the expense that is
inflicted and the closer the SLAPP filer moves to success. The
purpose of such gamesmanship ranges from simple retribution for
past activism to discouraging future activism. Needless to say, an
ultimate disposition in favor of the target often amounts merely to a
pyrrhic victory. Those who lack the financial resources and
emotional stamina to play out the “game” face the difficult choice of

3. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT 3–5 (1996); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV.
385, 386–89 (1988).
4. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT
L. REV. 937, 938 (1992).
5. Id. at 941 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3 (1989).
7. Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in
California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 971 (1999).
8. See, e.g., S.B. 1097, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2019) (“This chapter shall be
known and may be cited as the ‘Tennessee Public Participation Act.’”).
9. Pring & Canan, supra note 4, at 947.
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defaulting despite meritorious defenses or being brought to their knees
to settle. The ripple effect of such suits in our society is enormous.
Persons who have been outspoken on issues of public importance
targeted in such suits or who have witnessed such suits will often choose
in the future to stay silent. Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat
to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.10

Many believed that there needed to be an efficient way for victims of
SLAPP suits to fight back—or SLAPP back. This led to the creation of
anti-SLAPP statutes. The idea behind so-called “anti-SLAPP” laws was
that there should be a procedural mechanism in place to protect
citizens who have been sued by wealthy corporate actors merely to
intimidate and silence those citizens for exercising their First
Amendment freedoms of petition or speech.11 Originally, the statutes
were designed to provide protection primarily to the citizen-activist
who opposed the unfriendly environmental activities of a construction
company or large developer.12 Today, however, SLAPP suits reach a
much broader range of cases. Scholar Eric Goldman explained, “I
think about SLAPPS as covering any lawsuit that’s designed to suppress
socially important speech [such as consumer reviews or investigative
journalism] . . . there’s a wide range of other kinds of socially
important content that we want to encourage and foster.”13
Recognizing the dangers of SLAPP suits on citizen participation,
beginning in 1989, state legislatures began enacting so-called antiSLAPP laws that were designed to provide a procedural mechanism for
individuals to quickly dismiss meritless lawsuits merely designed to
silence the defendant’s voice.14 These statutes provide an expedited

10. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (footnote omitted).
11. Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, #aintturningtheothercheek: Using AntiSLAPP Law as a Defense in Social Media, 87 UMKC L. REV. 801, 802 (2019).
12. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 193–94 (explaining the enactment of New
York’s anti-SLAPP law, which focused narrowly on the relations between companies seeking
permits for public projects and individuals who comment or report on those public projects).
13. Eric Weslander, The First Amendment SLAPPS Back: An Overview of the Free-Speech
Protections of Kansas’ New Anti-SLAPP Statute, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Jan. 2018, at 30, 33 (quoting
Congressional Internet Caucus Academy, Frivolous Defamation Suits vs. Online Reviews—
Gagged by the Law(yers)?, YOUTUBE (June 7, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=q0L2efr0rSc [https://perma.cc/9YK4-CAKK] (statements of Eric Goldman)).
14. See, e.g., 1989 WASH. SESS. LAWS 1119–20 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.510 (2019)) (explaining that a person who acts in good faith when
reporting a “complaint or information to any agency . . . regarding any matter
reasonably of concern to that agency shall be immune from civil liability on claims
based upon the communication to the agency”).
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procedural process for defendants to rid themselves of frivolous
litigation.15 This expedited procedure usually includes a stay of
discovery that forces a court to decide a special motion to dismiss
within a specific time frame.16 If the defendant is successful in
SLAPPing back at the SLAPP suit, then these laws generally provide
that the defendant can obtain attorney fees and costs from the plaintiff
who filed the lawsuit.17
While such laws were designed to protect public activists who spoke
out against large corporate developers or other entities, the concept of
a SLAPP suit has morphed considerably. Now, the reach of many antiSLAPP statutes has expanded to cover freedom of speech, petition, and
association generally.18 California’s anti-SLAPP statute, for example,
allows a defendant in a SLAPP suit to file a “special motion to strike”
the suit if the suit arose from the exercise of a defendant’s “right [to]
petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue.”19 The
California law explicitly says that it “shall be construed broadly.”20
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute also applies broadly to “free speech in
connection with public issues,” which is defined broadly as “any written
or oral statement that is protected under applicable law and is made
before a governmental entity in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a governmental entity.”21
Tennessee’s new anti-SLAPP statute, called the Tennessee Public
Participation Act, is also broad.22 This new law aims to prevent lawsuits
that are designed to chill individuals’ rights to freedom of association,
speech, or petition.23 Maryland’s statute ostensibly envisions broad
coverage, as it applies to protect a person’s right to speak on “any issue
of public concern.”24

15. Robert T. Sherwin, Evidence? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Evidence!: How Ambiguity
in Some States’ Anti-SLAPP Laws Threatens to De-Fang a Popular and Powerful Weapon
Against Frivolous Litigation, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 431, 433 (2017).
16. Id. at 433, 437.
17. Id. at 437.
18. Dale W. Felton, Avoid the SLAPP Trap, HOUS. LAW., July/Aug. 2019, at 22, 22.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2019).
20. § 425.16(a).
21. FLA. STAT. § 768.295(2)(a) (2019).
22. See S.B. 1097, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2019). This measure passed the
Tennessee legislature and was signed by the governor. It went into effect on July 1, 2019.
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-17-103(2)–(4) (2019).
24. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807(c) (LexisNexis 2019).
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In contrast, anti-SLAPP laws in other states are more restrictive.
Missouri’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to lawsuits against a person “for
conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with a public
hearing or public meeting, in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a
tribunal or decision-making body of the state or any political subdivision
of the state.”25 Pennsylvania has an anti-SLAPP statute, called the
Environmental Immunity Act, which applies only to statements made in
relation to an environmental issue or regulation.26 Delaware’s anti-SLAPP
law applies only to acts of “public petition and participation.”27
The above-cited examples show that anti-SLAPP suits differ
significantly in terms of wording, process, and coverage. The more
effective anti-SLAPP suits apply to a broader range of suits. Thus, the
preferable model is one similar to California or the new Tennessee law,
which applies more broadly to communications that touch on matters
of public interest or concern.28 That certainly furthers free-expression
rights more than some that only protect individuals when they directly
petition a governmental agency.
The result has been that defamation suits arising out of political
campaigns often have been subject to anti-SLAPP statutes—in other
words, the plaintiffs have been SLAPPed back. Courts have recognized
that statements made during political campaigns are inherently speech
on matters of public interest that are most appropriate for application
of anti-SLAPP statutes.29 Take, for example, the defamation lawsuit
filed by Nevada casino mogul Sheldon Adelson for negative statements
made about him during the 2012 Presidential election when he
contributed substantial amounts of money to Newt Gingrich and Mitt

25. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528(1) (2019).
26. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301 (2019); see also Pennsbury Village Associates, LLC v.
McIntyre, 11 A.3d 906, 912 (Pa. 2011) (referring to the Pennsylvania anti-SLAPP
statute as the Environmental Immunity Act in the first Pennsylvania Supreme Court
case interpreting the statute).
27. 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a)(1) (2019).
28. See supra notes 19–20, 23 and accompanying text (explaining the wide
application of the California and Tennessee anti-SLAPP statutes).
29. Collier v. Harris, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 38–40 (Ct. App. 2015) (“‘The character
and qualifications of a candidate for public office constitutes a “public issue or public
interest”’ for purposes of [the anti-SLAPP statute] . . . . [The statute therefore]
‘applies to suits involving statements made during political campaigns.’” (first quoting
Vogel v. Felice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 357 (Ct. App. 2005); and then quoting Conroy v.
Spitzer 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 446 (1999))).
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Romney.30 According to Adelson, officers of the National Jewish
Democratic Council posted a statement on their website urging followers
to pressure then-presidential candidate Mitt Romney to abstain from
accepting money from Adelson, which, the statement claimed, Adelson
earned from promoting prostitution in his Chinese casinos.31 Despite these
statements, the court dismissed Adelson’s suit pursuant to the Nevada antiSLAPP law because the speech was clearly political: “the [National Jewish
Democratic Council’s online statements] were patently partisan statements
made by a Democratic organization to Democratic-leaning voters in an
effort to undermine Republican candidates’ financial support.”32
More recently, Danny Tarkanian, former point guard and son of the
legendary University of Nevada, Las Vegas basketball coach Jerry
Tarkanian,33 filed a defamation lawsuit against Jacky Rosen, whom he
opposed in the United States House of Representatives race in 2016.34
Tarkanian sued over an ad entitled “Integrity” that Rosen uploaded to
YouTube and other social media platforms.35
Tarkanian objected to three statements: “Danny Tarkanian set up 13
fake charities that preyed on vulnerable seniors”; “seniors lost millions
from the scams Danny Tarkanian helped set up”; and a statement that
called Tarkanian’s charities “fronts for telemarketing schemes.”36 After
Tarkanian filed suit for libel per se, slander per se, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, Rosen responded by filing a motion to
dismiss under the Nevada anti-SLAPP statute.37 The Nevada Supreme
Court granted Rosen’s motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute,
noting that the gist of her statements was true, “or at the very least her
statements were made without actual malice.”38
30. See Adelson v. Harris, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471–73, 487, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(applying Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute to online statements made about Adelson,
including that his money was “dirty” and “tainted”), aff’d, 876 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2017).
31. Id. at 471–73.
32. Id. at 496.
33. Alexander Bolton, Shark, Jr. Hopes to Take ’10 Bite out of Sen. Reid, HILL (Sept.
10, 2009, 10:05 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/58025-shark-jrhopes-to-take-10-bite-out-of-sen-reid [https://perma.cc/V235-BQHY]; see also
Tarkanian, Danny, OUR CAMPAIGNS, https://www.ourcampaigns.com/Candidate
Detail.html?CandidateID=44640 [https://perma.cc/J76G-N4PM].
34. Rosen v. Tarkanian, 453 P.3d 1220, 1221–22 (Nev. 2019) (en banc); Snyder,
supra note 1.
35. Rosen, 453 P.3d at 1222.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1222, 1225–26.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3605742

1548

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1541

A Texas appeals court reached a similar result in a case involving a
former city councilman who sued a sitting councilperson and others
for allegedly defamatory statements made on Facebook and other
venues.39 Frank Fernandez, a former councilman in Kennedale,
pleaded guilty to the crime of misdemeanor theft for stealing a silver
bar.40 A sitting member of the council and others made a variety of
statements about him on Facebook and other places that he claimed
were untrue, including the statement that he had “committed robbery
while being a Kennedale city council member.”41
The Texas appeals court easily found that the challenged statements
were statements covered by the Texas anti-SLAPP statute because the
statements “were made during a political contest.”42 The Texas appeals
court applied the substantial truth doctrine,43 which calls for courts to
examine the veracity of the alleged defamatory statements from the
perspective of “a person of ordinary intelligence,” and granted the
special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP law.44
The passage of stronger anti-SLAPP laws has increased the public’s
consciousness of frivolous lawsuits. It also has led some to question
whether some of these laws go too far and violate the constitutional
rights of those who file the lawsuits in the first place.45
But, an even more pressing reason exists for thoughtful discussion of
anti-SLAPP lawsuits—the astronomical expansion of speech during the
social media age.46 As one student commentator cogently explained:

39. Weber v. Fernandez, No. 02-18-00275-CV, 2019 WL 1395796, at *2 (Tex. App.
Mar. 28, 2019).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *5–6.
43. Id. at *1, *8, *11–13.
44. Id. at *20.
45. Nick Phillips & Ryan Pumpian, A Constitutional Counterpunch to Georgia’s AntiSLAPP Statute, 69 MERCER L. REV. 407, 408 (2018); Mitch Landberg, Anti-SLAPP: A
Constitutional Tug-of-War, LAW360 (June 25, 2015, 10:47 AM), https://www.
law360.com/articles/670930/anti-slapp-a-constitutional-tug-of-war (noting that antiSLAPP statutes can infringe on the First Amendment right to petition as well as the
right to trial by jury).
46. Lauren Bergelsen, Note, The Need for a Federal Anti-SLAPP Law in Today’s Digital
Media Climate, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 213, 214 (2019).
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The expansion of anti-SLAPP to public speech, particularly on the
Internet, presents a dilemma for policymakers: should they protect
the rights of petition and free speech from increased threat of
chilling, or should they protect defamation victims who are at a
significantly greater risk of harm from online libel? . . . The
expansion of anti-SLAPP laws into the realm of Internet defamation
law has upped the ante—the stakes for speakers and those they speak
about have risen significantly.47

While the stakes are higher, so are the hurdles for those seeking to
sue for defamation arising from social media posts about political
campaigns. Such speech has a hearty tradition and history of societal
acceptance and First Amendment protection.
II. HISTORY OF POLITICAL MUDSLINGING AND THE ENHANCED
PROTECTION OF POLITICAL SPEECH
Political campaigns historically have consisted of mudslinging,
muckraking, name calling, and other less than virtuous behavior.48 The
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans engaged in virtual warfare
through the press via pseudonyms, attacking each other’s positions on
a variety of issues.49 Ultimately, the Federalist Party used a federal law
known as the Sedition Act of 1798 to silence and even imprison
Democratic-Republican opponents.50 The Act “criminalized many
political speakers who engaged in speech about the proper workings
of a democratic government.”51
Through the years, politicians frequently engaged in mean-spirited
dialogue when referring to their opponents. Incivility—rather than
civility—ruled the day. A legal commentator more than fifty years ago
aptly noted that “[c]harges of gross incompetence, disregard of the
public interest, communist sympathies, and the like usually have filled
47. Andrew L. Roth, Comment, Upping the Ante: Rethinking Anti-SLAPP Laws in the
Age of the Internet, 2016 BYU L. REV. 741, 768 (2016).
48. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 32–33,
186–87, 201 (2000) (chronicling the divisive exchanges between Alexander Hamilton and
Aaron Burr preceding their duel at Weehawken and the tumultuous political events of the
late 1790s between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans).
49. See id. at 197–99 (portraying the fractious political debates between Federalists
and Democratic-Republicans in the late 1790s).
50. See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 131, 247, 251–54 (1956) (discussing prosecutions
in New England under the Sedition Act, where Democratic-Republican printers were
indicted and tried for printing and publishing “seditious libel”).
51. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:2 (2012).
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the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct
are not infrequent.”52 More recently, another legal commentator stated,
“Lies in politics and political campaigns are nothing new.”53
Consider the particularly apt statement from a California appeals court:
Our political history reeks of unfair, intemperate, scurrilous and
irresponsible charges against those in or seeking public office.
Washington was called a murderer, Jefferson a blackguard, a knave and
insane (“Mad Tom”), Henry Clay a pimp, Andrew Jackson a murderer
and an adulterer, and Andrew Johnson and Ulysses Grant drunkards.
Lincoln was called a half-witted usurper, a baboon, a gorilla, a ghoul.
Theodore Roosevelt was castigated as a traitor to his class, and Franklin
Delano Roosevelt as a traitor to his country. Dwight D. Eisenhower was
charged with being a conscious agent of the Communist Conspiracy.54

During the 1800 election between incumbent John Adams and his
former vice president Thomas Jefferson, Adams’ supporters falsely
claimed that if Jefferson won the election, Americans “would see their
wives and daughters the victims of legal prostitution.”55 In the 1880s,
President Grover Cleveland was accused of fathering a child out of wedlock
and had to endure campaign chants of “Ma, Ma, Where’s My Pa?”56
The reality is that one should expect that statements made during the
course of a political campaign often will be contentious and unpleasant.57
Many degenerate into a “reckless disregard for the truth.”58 Another
commentator emphasizes that political campaigns are riddled with
negative and false advertising.59 This phenomenon leads to a “diminution
of the public debate” and thoughtful discourse.60

52. Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875,
875 (1949).
53. Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth: Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarications, Bullshit,
and Straight-Out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 367, 367 (2017).
54. Desert Sun Publ’g Co. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1979).
55. Jason Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for the Truth?: The Constitutional Right to Lie in
Politics, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 41, 44 (2016) (quoting Rick Ungar, The Dirtiest Campaign
Ever? Not Even Close!, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2012, 7:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/rickungar/2012/08/20/the-dirtiest-presidential-campaign-ever-not-even-close
[https://perma.cc/U8KP-LT4X]).
56. Id. at 44.
57. Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1989) (“There may be no public
context more contentious than a political campaign.”).
58. Zenor, supra note 55, at 43.
59. Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82
TUL. L. REV. 889, 890 (2008).
60. Id. at 895.
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Robert Bork, then an appeals court judge on the D.C. Circuit,
explained that libel suits arising out of political campaigns often must
fail because of the First Amendment. Judge Bork explained in two
noteworthy passages:
It arouses concern that a freshening stream of libel actions, which
often seem as much designed to punish writers and publications as
to recover damages for real injuries, may threaten the public and
constitutional interest in free, and frequently rough, discussion.
Those who step into areas of public dispute, who choose the
pleasures and distractions of controversy, must be willing to bear
criticism, disparagement, and even wounding assessments. Perhaps
it would be better if disputation were conducted in measured
phrases and calibrated assessments, and with strict avoidance of the
ad hominem; better, that is, if the opinion and editorial pages of the
public press were modeled on The Federalist Papers. But that is not
the world in which we live, ever have lived, or are ever likely to know,
and the law of the first amendment must not try to make public
dispute safe and comfortable for all the participants. That would
only stifle the debate.61

Judge Bork continued in his concurring opinion:
In deciding a case like this, therefore, one of the most important
considerations is whether the person alleging defamation has in some
real sense placed himself in an arena where he should expect to be
jostled and bumped in a way that a private person need not expect.
Where politics and ideas about politics contend, there is a first
amendment arena. The individual who deliberately enters that arena
must expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal.62

Another California appeals court perhaps summed it up best: “In
America, one who seeks or holds public office may not be thin of skin.
One planning to engage in politics, American style, should remember
the words credited to Harry S. Truman[:] ‘If you can’t stand the heat,
get out of the kitchen.’”63
The court’s reference to President Truman’s famous phrase
indicates a mindset by the judiciary that political candidates entering
the arena should expect to deal with much intemperate, obnoxious,
and perhaps defamatory expression. But history and tradition are not
the only reasons why many courts seemingly disfavor defamation suits

61. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 1002 (emphasis added).
63. Desert Sun Publ’g Co. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1979).
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filed by political candidates. The other main reason is the First
Amendment’s staunch protection of political speech in general.
The text of the First Amendment draws no textual distinctions based
on the type of speech, reading only that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”64 However, the reality is otherwise.
First Amendment jurisprudence accords different levels of protection
depending upon the type of speech.65 For example, commercial
speech receives less protection, as does sexual expression.66
But political speech represents the core type of speech the First
Amendment was designed to protect.67 The U.S. Supreme Court famously
declared that there is a “profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”68 Two
years later, the Court explained: “Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs.”69
The reality, as one state supreme court jurist wrote years ago:
“Political speech involving public officials, especially that made during
political campaigns, seems to be especially protected.”70

64. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. HUDSON, supra note 51, § 2:5 (“Although the text of the First Amendment
provides that ‘Congress shall make no law,’ the freedom does not protect all types of
speech.”).
66. Id. § 6:1 (“Commercial speech, or advertising, represents a category of speech that
receives a reduced level of First Amendment protection.”); id. § 4.1 (“Pornography and
sexual expression historically have received scant free-speech protection.”).
67. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that political speech
represents the “zenith” of First Amendment protection); Barry P. McDonald, The First
Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information
in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 309 (2004) (noting that “protection of
speech of a political nature lies at the ‘core’ of the First Amendment”).
68. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
69. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
70. Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 931 (Ala. 1992) (Maddux, J., dissenting).
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III. RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE
One concept that provides significant breathing space to freedom of
expression is rhetorical hyperbole.71 Rhetorical hyperbole has been
defined as “‘‘extravagant exaggeration’ ‘employed for rhetorical
effect.’”72 This concept provides that even heated and emotional
rhetoric deserves free-speech protection in a free society.73 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the use of the term “blackmail” to refer to a
developer’s negotiating style was rhetorical hyperbole more than an
imputation of criminal conduct.74 The Court reasoned that “even the
most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered
[the developer’s] negotiating position extremely unreasonable.”75
The U.S. Supreme Court also applied the concept to determine that
a union’s use of the term “scab” was rhetorical hyperbole rather than
unprotected defamation.76 The Court reasoned that the use of the term
in a union dispute was an example of “loose, figurative” language rather
than defamation.77 The Court further explained that the use of the term
did not imply that the employees were actually committing crimes.78
In yet another defamation case, the U.S. Supreme Court again
discussed the doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole. The Court noted that
“statements that cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts
about an individual” made in debate over public matters are
constitutionally protected to “provide[] assurance that public debate will
not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’
which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.”79
More than twenty years later, scholar Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
presciently noted that it is “fair to predict that many of the new Internet

71. David L. Hudson, Jr., Rhetorical Hyperbole Protects Free Speech, FREEDOM F. INST.
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2018/10/28/rhetoricalhyperbole-protects-free-speech [https://perma.cc/L9QW-P6L6].
72. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Gill, 6 S.W.3d 19, 30 (Tex. App. 1999) (quoting WEBSTER’S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 592, 1011 (1988)).
73. Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 702 (11th Cir. 2002).
74. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970).
75. Id. at 14.
76. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285–86 (1974).
77. Id. at 284.
78. Id. at 285.
79. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (alteration in original).
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libel cases will involve rhetorical hyperbole.”80 What Lidsky—or most
people—probably could not have predicted is that the defense would
protect Donald J. Trump as President of the United States of America
instead of as a celebrity television star.81
President Trump certainly has a penchant for engaging in rhetorical
hyperbole, and the doctrine has proven an effective defense in litigation.82
For example, a federal district court in California found that President
Trump’s negative tweets about Stephanie Clifford, a.k.a. Stormy Daniels,
were rhetorical hyperbole protected by the First Amendment.83 The
Court reasoned that the Trumpian communications were made in
response to criticism of the President: “If this Court were to prevent Mr.
Trump from engaging in this type of ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ against a political
adversary, it would significantly hamper the office of the President.”84
Similarly, a Texas appeals court used the doctrine of rhetorical
hyperbole in a defamation suit that arose during a political campaign
in Rehak Creative Services, Inc. v. Witt.85 The case involved various posts
made to the campaign website of Ann L. Witt, who ran unsuccessfully
for the 2012 Republican primary for House District 133.86 Witt
challenged incumbent Jim Murphy, who had held the position since
2006 and previously had been president of a “municipal management
district” in a part of Houston known as the Westchase District.87
Before serving, Murphy sought an opinion as to whether he could serve
both in the legislature and as president of the Westchase District.88 During
the campaign, Witt accused Murphy of “sidestep[ping]” the Texas

80. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace,
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 943 (2000).
81. See Patrick Radden Keefe, How Mark Burnett Resurrected Donald Trump as an Icon
of American Success, NEW YORKER (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2019/01/07/how-mark-burnett-resurrected-donald-trump-as-an-icon-ofamerican-success [https://perma.cc/D344-BE26].
82. David L. Hudson, Jr., The First Amendment Has Protected President Donald J. Trump,
FREEDOM F. INST. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/
12/02/the-first-amendment-has-protected-president-donald-j-trump
[https://perma.cc/LT7Y-82F8].
83. Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (explaining that
President Trump’s tweet exclaimed “[a] sketch years later about a nonexistent man. A
total con job, playing the Fake News Media for Fools (but they know it)!”).
84. Id. at 927.
85. 404 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App. 2013).
86. Id. at 719–21.
87. Id. at 720.
88. Id. at 720.
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Constitution by serving in the legislature while receiving payments as a
consultant to Westchase District through a limited liability company
that Murphy created and of which he was the sole member.89
On a campaign website titled “How to Succeed in Government
Without Really Trying,” Witt essentially accused Murphy of improperly
lining his own pockets while serving as a politician. One of the posts read:
STEP 1: Help create a new taxing entity.
STEP 2: Hire yourself as its top bureaucrat.
STEP 3: Make $290,000 a year off taxpayers.
STEP 4: Sidestep that pesky Texas Constitution.
STEP 5: Get a second government job.
STEP 6: Reward your supporters with government contracts.90

Another version of this six-step success process stated that
“Westchase District has awarded government contracts to the following
companies, and the CEOs of these companies have contributed more
than $48,000 in cash and services to Jim’s campaigns for State
Representative.”91 One of these listed companies was Rehak Creative
Services, owned by Robert Rehak.92
Rehak sued Witt for defamation, “business disparagement; tortious
interference with business relationships and prospective business
opportunities; intentional infliction of emotional distress; civil
conspiracy; conversion; and misappropriation.”93 Rehak specifically
objected to Witt’s websites using the words “rewarding,” “ripping off,”
and “bilking.”94 He argued that these words juxtaposed the history of
Rehak Creative’ Services contracts with Westchase District against
Rehak’s political contributions to Murphy, leading to the false
impression that Rehak was attempting to “gain[] influence over an
elected official to obtain work, to steal and cheat taxpayers, and to help
the elected official break the law.”95
The trial court granted a motion by Witt to dismiss Rehak’s claims
under the Texas anti-SLAPP statute.96 The Texas Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling and classified Rehak’s lawsuit as a
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id. at 723.
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SLAPP suit.97 A sizeable portion of the analysis of the defamation claim
focused on the doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole.98
The appeals court reasoned: “Viewing the challenged statements as
a whole and in context, we conclude that a person of ordinary
intelligence would perceive these words as nothing more than
rhetorical hyperbole.”99 The court explained that, given the
statement’s tone and context, an “ordinarily intelligent” individual
would not take the vigorous criticisms “at face value.”100 Finally, the
appeals court noted that “[t]he ordinary reader would understand that
Witt’s vigorous criticism targeted the incumbent elected official she
hoped to unseat in the primary—not Rehak.”101
Another California appeals court applied the doctrine of rhetorical
hyperbole to shield a defendant in a case that arose out of a political
campaign.102 The case involved two candidates for the California
assembly, James E. Reed and James Gallagher.103 Toward the end of
the campaign, Gallagher ran a television ad that referred to Reed as an
“unscrupulous lawyer.”104 The ad read:
Jim Reed has launched a negative and misleading campaign, but just
who is Jim Reed? Legal records show that Reed is an unscrupulous
lawyer who was sued for negligence, fraud and financial elder abuse.
Reed’s even been ordered to pay back fees he improperly collected
from an elderly client. His victim said about Reed, ‘He saw a naïve
widow and took advantage of me, raked me over the coals.’ Jim Reed.
Not our values.105

After Reed lost the election, he sued Gallagher for defamation. Reed
challenged four express and implied statements in the political campaign
ad: “(1) that legal records show Reed is an ‘unscrupulous lawyer,’ (2) that
Reed had been ordered to pay back fees he improperly collected from an
elderly client, (3) that one of the documents in the ad is an order
directing Reed to repay fees, and (4) that Reed is a ‘crook.’”106

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 719.
Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
Reed v. Gallagher, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 188 (Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.
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Gallagher responded by filing a motion to dismiss under California’s
anti-SLAPP law.107 The appeals court determined that the
characterizations of Reed as an “unscrupulous lawyer” and “a crook” are
classic rhetorical hyperbole, not a provable false statement of fact.108 The
court also emphasized the context of the political campaign in reaching
its determination: “Here, the challenged statement was made during the
heat of a political campaign, a context in which the audience would
naturally anticipate the use of rhetorical hyperbole.”109
The defamation lawsuits against Trump, Witt, and Gallagher all
arose out of statements made in the heat of a political debate or a
political campaign. The challenged statements in each of these cases
used provocative language. All three reviewing courts recognized that
such provocative language is a form of rhetorical hyperbole.
These cases all show that the doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole is a
significant hurdle in online defamation cases arising out of political
campaigns. In the words of one court “Hyperbole, distortion, invective,
and tirades are as much a part of American politics as kissing babies.”110
CONCLUSION
Online speech that exaggerates, distorts, and paints a less than
complete picture is a problem. Such speech has become a “vast
breeding ground for . . . defamation.”111 Defamation law serves a very
important purpose in protecting persons from reputation harm. In the
words of Justice Potter Stewart, it “reflects no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being.”112 In
the social media age, speech has exploded, including defamation.
However, the prevalence of anti-SLAPP laws, the judicial protections
afforded to political speech, and the defense of rhetorical hyperbole
all make it very difficult to recover for defamation arising out of social
media posts during political campaigns.
Many defamation suits arising out of political campaigns will be
targeted as SLAPP suits. Particularly in those jurisdictions that have

107. Id. at 181.
108. Id. at 190–91.
109. Id. at 191.
110. Beilenson v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 364 (Ct. App. 1996).
111. Heidi Frostestad Kuehl, Free Speech and Defamation in an Era of Social Media: An
Analysis of Federal and Illinois Norms in the Context of Anonymous Online Defamers, N. ILL.
U. L. REV., Summer 2016, at 28, 31.
112. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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broad coverage under their anti-SLAPP statutes, such as California and
Tennessee, defamation suits face an uphill climb. Second, history and
tradition demonstrate that political campaigns are a precursor to the
rough-and-tumble world of a mixed martial arts or no-holds-barred
type contest. Closely related to history and tradition is the strong First
Amendment principle that political speech receives the greatest
amount of protection. Furthermore, the doctrine of rhetorical
hyperbole will protect much loose, figurative, and exaggerated
language that often characterizes political campaign speech.
As one court wrote over two decades ago, “The overwhelming weight
of authority is that campaign rhetoric is protected speech and, as such,
recovery by a candidate is highly unusual.”113 Political campaigns often
produce uncivil, unpleasant and even repugnant dialogue. But, the
First Amendment often protects such unsavory expression.

113. Beilenson, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365.
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